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EVIDENCE

I.

HEARSAY

In Clark v. United States,' the defendant was convicted for the murder
of his former girlfriend. At trial, various hearsay statements of the deceased were admitted into evidence, detailing prior incidents of hostility
and violence between her and the defendant and indicating her intent to
meet the defendant at the site of her murder on the morning she was
killed. The statements were all admitted under the "state-of-mind" exception to the hearsay rule. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the "state-of-mind" exception
applies only when the declarant's state of mind is at issue.2 Here the issue
was the defendant's motivation. Statements of the deceased that indicated
her feelings toward the defendant were not probative of that issue.' Also,
the deceased's presence at the scene of the crime was never at issue. Consequently, hearsay statements to the effect that she had intended to be
there were irrelevant. Moreover, to the extent they intimated that the defendant would be there also, they were pure (and highly prejudicial) hearsay.'
In Jackson v. United States,' the defendant, on trial for murder, admitted he had been at the scene of the crime but denied he had fired the fatal
shot. A detective testified during cross-examination that he had been told
by an eyewitness that someone other than the defendant had shot the deceased. The eyewitness-declarant was unavailable to testify at trial. The
trial court struck the detective's testimony from the record as inadmissible
under any firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also declined to admit the statement. The court
appeared to follow Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), which requires a
1. 412 A.2d 21 (D.C. 1980).
2. Id at 30; accord, Fox v. United States, 421 A.2d 9 (D.C. 1980).
3. 412 A.2d at 28.

4. The Court thus agreed with Justice Traynor's dissent in People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.
2d 177, 183, 148 P.2d 627, 633 (1944) ("The only purpose that could be served by admitting
such declarations would be to induce the belief that the defendant went out with the deceased, took her to the scene of the crime, and there murdered her. Her declarations cannot
be admitted for that purpose without setting aside the rule against hearsay.") (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
5. 424 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1980).
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statement to have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" to be admissible.6 The court found no such guarantees. 7 The eyewitness's statement was made neither under oath nor in the presence of the
trier of fact, and its veracity was not tested by cross-examination. It was
thus distinguishable from cases where otherwise inadmissible testimony
given at preliminary hearings was admitted under Rule 804(b)(5). 8 The
court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Brandt v. Uniroyal,Inc. ,'
limited the extent to which a written report of one expert could be used to
impeach the oral testimony of another expert. The plaintiffs expert testified that, in his opinion, the plaintiffs injuries had been caused by a defect
in the defendant-manufacturer's tire. Defense counsel asked on cross-examination to what extent plaintiffs expert had relied on the written report
of another expert who found no defect but who did not testify at trial.
After stating that he had not relied on the report at all, the plaintiffs expert
was asked his reaction to certain conclusions that were read verbatim from
the report. The court recognized that an expert witness may be examined
as to the factual basis underlying his opinion. However, here "[tlhe [written] report was not used to determine the basis of [the plaintiffs expert's]
opinion; the sole purpose for continuing to read from the [written] report
was to offer it to the jury for the truth of the matter asserted therein.""0
Admission of this hearsay constituted reversible error I' and the court remanded the case for a new trial.
II. IMPEACHMENT

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in Scott v. United
6. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) provides in pertinent part:
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
7. The Federal Rules of Evidence are not controlling in the District of Columbia. 424
A.2d at 42.
8. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).
9. 425 A.2d 162 (D.C.1980).

10. Id at 165 (citing Nemeth v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Mich. App. 359, 232 N.W.2d 404
(1975)).
11. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). Accord, Fox v. United
States, 421 A.2d 9, 12 (D.C. 1980); Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21, 30 (D.C. 1980).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 30:754

States,' 2 that a party may not impeach its own witness unless the court
finds that the party was surprised by its witness's testimony,13 and that the
"cancel or neutralize any damagimpeachment evidence is allowed only to
'4
ing effect of the surprising testimony."1
A government witness in a rape prosecution had made statements to two
different detectives before trial. The second statement tended to incriminate the defendant. In an interview with the prosecuting attorney, two
days before trial, the witness denied ever having made the incriminating
second statement. At trial, the witness denied having made both statements and the government was allowed to impeach his credibility by calling both detectives to testify to the two prior statements. The court
re versed and remanded for a new trial. It noted that the government was
surprised only by the witness's denial of his first [non-incriminating] statement and that any impeachment attempt would have to be directed to the
damaging effect of the surprise. Although the witness surprisingly failed to
give certain testimony, the surprise created no "affirmative damage" to the
government's case. 15 Since it was pointless to impeach a witness who had
not testified to anything, the only possible function the "impeachment"
evidence could perform was impermissibly "to supply the anticipated testimony."' 6 Because such testimony was highly prejudicial hearsay, the
court found reversible error.
In Williams v. United States,'7 a case of first impression, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals limited the circumstances under which a
showing of defendant's rehabilitation may bar the use of a prior conviction
for impeachment purposes. On trial for a handgun violation, the defendant sought unsuccessfully to bar the introduction of evidence of his prior
conviction for second degree murder by showing that he had been granted
early parole. The defendant argued that early parole was equivalent to the
"certificate of rehabilitation" required by section 14-305(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the
District of Columbia Code'" to render the evidence of his prior conviction
12. 412 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1980).
13. Id at 367. The court quoted D.C. CODE § 14-102 (1973) in pertinent part:
When the court is satisfied that the party producing a witness has been taken by
surprise by the testimony of the witness, it may allow the party to prove, for the
purpose only of affecting the credibility of the witness, that the witness has made to
the party or to his attorney statements substantially variant from his sworn testimony about material facts in the cause.
14. 412 A.2d at 367 (citing Byrd v. District of Columbia, 43 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1945)).
15. Id at 367-68.
16. Id at 368. See Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938).
17. 421 A.2d 19 (D.C. 1980).
18. D.C. CODE § 14-305(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1973) provides in pertinent part: "(2)(A) Evidence
of a conviction of a witness is inadmissible under this section if-. . . (ii) the conviction has
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inadmissible. The court ruled that the granting of early parole required
only that the prisoner be "respond[ing] well to the rehabilitation"' 9 and
that actual accomplishment of rehabilitation would be manifested only by
a discontinuance of parole supervision. 20 Thus, "a finding that the prisoner is sufficiently rehabilitated for parole is not equivalent to a finding
that he has been so completely rehabilitated that the probative value of his
conviction on the issue of his credibility has been diminished."'" The
court affirmed the defendant's conviction.
III.

PRESUMPTIONS

In Cooper v. United States,2 2 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
outlined the narrow circumstances in which a "missing witness" instruction may be given. In an armed robbery prosecution, the defendant
presented an alibi defense, claiming that he had been in Florida with several other people on the date of the crime. When defense counsel failed to
produce the defendant's aunt, who allegedly had been with the defendant
on his trip to Florida, the government requested and was given an instruction that the jury could presume that her testimony, if produced, would
have been unfavorable to the defendant's alibi defense. The court found
that the first of two prerequisites for giving the missing witness instruction
was satisfied: the witness was "peculiarly available" to the defendant.2 3
However, the court found the second condition unsatisfied: the defendant's
aunt was not likely to "elucidate the transaction. '24 Her credibility was
suspect because of her familial relationship with the defendant and her
apparent drinking problem. Furthermore, her testimony-following previous testimony by other alibi witnesses-would have been merely cumulative. In light ofjudicial skepticism about "creat[ing] evidence from nonevidence," 25 the jury should not have been permitted to draw negative inferences from the failure of the defendant's aunt to testify. The substantial
discrediting of the defendant's alibi defense by other sources, however,
precluded a finding that the missing witness instruction amounted to reversible error.2 6 The court affirmed the conviction.
been the subject of a certifcate of rehabilitationor its equivalent and such witness has not
been convicted of a subsequent criminal offense. (emphasis added)
19. 421 A.2d at 23. See D.C. CODE § 24-201c (1973).
20. 421 A.2d at 24.
21. Id at 23.
22. 415 A.2d 528 (D.C. 1980).
23. Id at 533-34. See Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212 (D.C. 1976).
24. 415 A.2d at 534. See Brown v. United States, 414 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
25. 415 A.2d at 533. See Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26. 415 A.2d at 535. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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In Kinardv. United States,2 7 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
joined the vast majority of jurisdictions2 8 in abandoning thefalsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) instruction to the
jury. When two government witnesses gave conflicting testimony as to
whether they had spoken with each other about the case prior to trial, defense counsel requested thefalsus in uno instruction. Such an instruction
would have advised the jurors that they "may disregard all or part of the
testimony of a witness whom they believe to have testified falsely as to a
material matter."29 The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the request and held that the instruction no longer would be appropriate in the
District of Columbia. The court stated that the instruction was superfluous
and confusing.3" To the extent that the jury had been instructed already as
to its general duty to determine the credibility of each witness and to weigh
the testimony accordingly, thefalsus in uno charge was mere repetition. It
added only the confusing implication that some special exception was to
be applied when a juror concluded that a witness had testified falsely.
More importantly, the instruction was potentially prejudicial, 3' since it
gave the jury the impression that the judge thought a witness had lied.
This could both distract the jury from its consideration of the merits and
ultimately color the jury's verdict.
IV.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

In Martin v. Washington Hospital Center,32 a wrongful death action, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a judgment n.o.. in defendant hospital's favor on the ground that the trial court had improperly
required the plaintiff to provide expert medical testimony as to proximate
cause. Martin entered the hospital in a disoriented state. The hospital released him eight hours later without psychiatric evaluation. He exhibited
bizarre patterns of behavior for twelve hours after his release and finally
died when his automobile, traveling at high speed, went out of control and
crashed into another car. The court held that the appellant, Martin's
mother and the personal representative of his estate, need not supply expert testimony that such behavior manifested a mental disorder likely to
27. 416 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1980).

28. See, e.g., United States v. Taglianetti, 456 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v.
Harris, 346 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1965); Knihal v. State, 150 Neb. 771, 36 N.W.2d 109 (1949);
Rowland v. St. Mary's Bank, 93 N.H. 246, 40 A.2d 741 (1944); State v. Harris, 106 R.I. 643,
262 A.2d 374 (1970).
29. 416 A.2d at 1234.
30. Id at 1234-35.
31. Id at 1235 (quoting Knihal v. State, 150 Neb. 771, 36 N.W.2d 109 (1949)).
32. 423 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1980).
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persist long enough to cause the plaintiff to injure himself. At trial, the
appellant had established that the hospital was negligent in prematurely
releasing the deceased. The court stated that the evidence, which supported the inference of causation, did not so "involve the merits and performance of scientific treatment, complex medical procedures, or the
exercise of professional skill and judgment"3 3 as to be beyond the ordinary
knowledge and experience of the jury and require expert testimony.
V.

PRIVILEGE

In In re Estate of Wilson," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
overruled Hutchins v. Hutchins35 and held that the "legal representative,"
for purposes of waiving the physician-patient privilege36 in a will contest,
included the decedent's heirs-at-law as well as the executor, either eo
nomine 37 or dejure. At trial, the decedent's heirs-at-law sought to challenge the validity of the will by introducing medical records to show that
the decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time he made his will.
The executor objected and the trial court refused to admit the records,
ruling that, consistent with Hutchins, only a qualified executor could waive
the privilege. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. First, the
court recognized that, in contexts other than will contests, District of Columbia courts have held that the decedent's heirs-at-law are his legal representatives. 38 The court noted that the term "legal representative" has
traditionally been given a broader construction 39 than the more restrictive
33. Id. at 915-16 (quoting Harris v. Cafritz Memorial Hosp., 364 A.2d 135, 137 (D.C.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977)).
34. 416 A.2d 228 (D.C. 1980).
35. 48 App. D.C. 495 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (an heir is not a "legal representative" for the
purpose of waiving the physician-patient privilege).
36. D.C. CODE § 14-307(a) (Supp. VII 1980) states:
In the federal courts in the District of Columbia and District of Columbia courts
a physician or surgeon or mental health professional ... may not be permitted,
without the consent of the person afflicted, or of his legal representative, to disclose
any information, confidential in its nature, that he has acquired in attending a
client in a professional capacity and that was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, whether the information was obtained from the client or from his family
or from the person or persons in charge of him.
37. Contra, McCartney v. Holmquist, 106 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
38. See, e.g., Thomas v. Doyle, 187 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (adopted son of the decedent, who sued stepfather on the ground that stepfather, while still married to his first wife at
the time he purported to marry the decedent, committed fraud on the decedent, thereby
causing her to convey her property to him as joint tenant, may waive the privilege as the
"legal representative"); Calhoun v. Jacobs, 141 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (suit by grantor's
heirs to set aside, on the ground of grantor's mental incapacity, a conveyance of real property to a stranger).
39. 416 A.2d at 231-32.
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"personal representative." Furthermore, jurisdictions with even more restrictive statutes, with no provision for waiver of the privilege after the
patient's death by anyone, have permitted heirs to waive the privilege.4 °
Finally, the court found it illogical to restrict the waiver of the privilege in
the manner of Hutchins. "[I]f there is to be a fair, well-informed adjudication as to decedent's testamentary capacity, the parties on both sides of4 1a
will contest must be allowed to waive the physician-patient privilege."
VI.

Voir Dire

In Smith v. United States,42 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that, while the determination of a witness's competency to testify and
the method of examination employed to test that competency are within
the trial court's discretion, should the court choose to conduct such an examination in an adversarial context, the right to cross-examine the witness
must be preserved. When the government in a murder prosecution sought
to have a minor testify as an eyewitness, defense counsel requested a pretrial voir dire examination of the child for the purpose of testing her competency to testify. Both the court and the prosecution questioned the child,
but the trial court denied defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine
her during voir dire. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found
this to be a deprivation of the defendant's due process right to confront the
witnesses against him.4 3 This constitutional infirmity could not be cured
by permitting cross-examination at trial since counsel's attack on the credibility of a child would risk the hostility of the jury. The court found the
constitutional error harmless, however, because the defendant would have
been convicted even without the child's testimony."
John Egan

40. Id at 231 n.5, 235.

41. Id at 235.
42. 414 A.2d 1189 (D.C. 1980).
43. See Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1978).

44. 414 A.2d at 1199.

